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do compliance programs work to prevent cartels? 
only to the extent we as a society want them to.
Joseph E. Murphy & Donna Boehme1
1. Introduction
the aim of this paper is to review the pioneering experience of uk competition 
authorities in rewarding infringing companies – for efforts to comply with competition 
law – by reducing fines for committed violations, such as participation in cartels. the 
uk approach will be analysed through the prism of its possible application in russia, 
where antimonopoly laws have, during the last decade, been sequentially renewed 
in accordance with European competition law, and, at present, continue to actively 
respond to the development of the best international competition practice, including 
cartel deterrence. the relative position of officials in the russian antimonopoly body2 
with respect to advocating antimonopoly compliance in russia will be presented in 
the paper3 through empirical research and a face-to-face interview conducted by 
the author of the paper [hereinafter Interview].
Cartels are generally considered to be ‘the most socially harmful anticompetitive 
practice’4 through their adverse effect on the global economy and public interest.5 Cartels 
are defined as agreements between competing companies, aimed at coordinating their 
competitive behaviour on the market through practices such as price fixing, the sharing 
of markets or customer allocation, the limiting of supply or production, whether through 
bid rigging or otherwise.6 Being illegal and secretive, ‘hard core’ cartels have become 
‘a feature of the corporate landscape’7 in diverse areas of the world economy.8
It has been over a decade since competition authorities of the two major 
jurisdictions with their most successful competition laws – the united states and 
the European union – combined their efforts to make anti-cartel enforcement a 
‘number one antitrust priority and in persuading other jurisdictions around the 
1  Joseph E. Murphy & donna Boehme, Fear No Evil: A Compliance and Ethics Professionals’ Response to Dr. 
Stephan 11, ssrN (Nov. 28, 2011), <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1965733> (accessed May 16, 2015).
2  the Federal Antimonopoly service of russia [hereinafter FAs].
3  See infra, sec. 5.3.
4  Eleanor J. Morgan, Controlling Cartels: Implications of the EU Policy Reforms, 27(1) European Management 
Journal 1 (2009). doi:10.1016/j.emj.2008.04.006
5  Id.
6  Commission Notice on Immunity from Fines and reduction of Fines in Cartel Cases, 2006 o.J. (C 298) 
17, at ¶ 1.
7  Morgan, supra n. 4, at 1.
8  Id.
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world to join their common crusade against cartels.’9 the united kingdom introduced 
reforms ‘reflecting an attitude of “zero tolerance” towards cartels,’10 including criminal 
prosecution for offending individuals.11 similarly, russia attempted more stringent 
and restrictive policies with respect to cartels, including a leniency programme12 
and turnover fines13 for the cartelists.
two key elements of cartel deterrence are the imposition of sanctions, including 
considerable turnover fines, and a leniency policy. All these instruments are applied, 
with some variations, in the usA and the Eu, the uk, russia and other countries.
Between 2000 and 2010, the us and the Eu competition authorities imposed over 
$4.6 billion and €13 billion respectively in penalties against cartels, with more than 
200 executives engaged in cartels sentenced to prison in the us and ninety criminal 
cases filed during 2011, ‘the highest number filed in the last two decades.’14
Nevertheless, it has been argued that ‘the increasing global emphasis on anti-
cartel enforcement and harsh sanctions’15 could have been much more successful 
in deterring cartel practices. Cartels continue to exist in many sectors of the global 
economy.16 this suggests that the approach to antitrust enforcement requires 
rethinking, and the necessity to move beyond the traditional enforcement approach, 
to creating a pro-compliance culture in companies.17
As such, robust compliance programmes, voluntarily implemented by companies to 
prevent infringements of competition law could be considered as a major supplemental 
element of cartel deterrence.
Competition compliance programmes are described as a ‘set of measures 
adopted within a company . . . to educate and instruct its personnel about the 
antitrust prohibitions.’18 they have been implemented by many major companies 
9  Joseph Murphy & william kolasky, The Role of Anti-Cartel Compliance Programs in Preventing Cartel 
Behavior, 26(2) Antitrust 61 (2012), available at <http://summerconvention.utahbar.org/2014/materials/
h2_Cartel%20Compliance%20Programs.pdf> (accessed May 16, 2015).
10  david henry, Leniency Programmes: An Anaemic Carrot for Cartels in France, Germany and the UK?, 
26(1) E.C.L.r., sec. 2 (2005).
11  Id.
12  the leniency policy aims to provide cartelists with an incentive to report the cartel to the competition 
authority in return for being rewarded full immunity from sanctions.
13  turnover fines are calculated as a paticular percentage of the offender’s annual turnover in the relevant 
market, and as a rule are very high.
14  Murphy & kolasky, supra n. 9, at 61.
15  Id.
16  Id.
17  Anne riley & d. daniel sokol, Rethinking Compliance 6, ssrN (Aug. 25, 2014), <http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2475959> (accessed May 16, 2015).
18  wouter P.J. wils, Antitrust Compliance Programmes and Optimal Antitrust Enforcement, 1(1) Journal of 
Antitrust Enforcement 52 n. 1 (2013), available at <http://antitrust.oxfordjournals.org/content/1/1/52.
full.pdf+html> (accessed May 16, 2015). doi:10.1093/jaenfo/jns006
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in the world, especially by us trade corporations,19 but a strong compliance culture 
is by no means uniformly found.20
As the implementation of effective compliance programmes requires companies 
to put significant effort and resources into this process, the issue as to whether the 
competition authorities should provide incentives for such companies by reducing 
fines in case of their failure to prevent the infringement, has become a key topic for 
academic and practitioner discussions. this Paper addresses the relative arguments 
in Ch. 2 as a general background in order to identify the concept and the key issues 
relating to the implementation of compliance programmes.
unlike the majority of competition authorities (including the us, the Eu, 
russia), uk competition authorities21 have put efficient emphasis on encouraging 
companies to implement compliance programmes by regularly granting reduction 
in fines to companies they consider have taken ‘adequate steps’22 towards ensuring 
competition law compliance, but nevertheless failing to avoid breaking the law.23 
the brief overview of the relevant Eu and uk competition law will be given in Ch. 3, 
and legal grounds for a reduction in fines, their enforcement and the practical steps 
undertaken by the CMA to assist businesses in tackling competition compliance 
issues will be discussed in Ch. 4 below.
In the light of the growing significance of competition compliance culture in 
preventing antitrust violations, the uk’s experience in the recognition of benefits of 
compliance programmes may represent a particular interest for the FAs, which only 
recently voiced its intention ‘to develop and implement a set of measures with regards 
to the advocacy of the antimonopoly compliance’24 within the next ten years.
this paper will ask whether russian competition law is mature enough to adopt 
the uk approach, and what the level of existing compliance mechanisms in russia are. 
19  Antitrust Compliance: Perspectives and resources for Corporate Counselors viii, secs. M1–M9 (ABA 
Pub. 2005).
20  d. daniel sokol, Cartels, Corporate Compliance and What Practitioners Really Think about Enforcement, 
78(1) Antitrust Law Journal 236 (2012), available at <http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract_id=2079336> 
(accessed May 16, 2015).
21  Competition and Markets Authority [hereinafter CMA] has taken the responsibility of the former 
competition bodies in the uk – the office of Fair trading [hereinafter oFt] and Competition 
Commission (CC) since April 1, 2014, as a result of major competition reforms, introduced by the 
Enterprise and regulatory reform Act of April 25, 2014.
22  oFt’s guidance as to the Appropriate Amount of a Penalty (oFt 2012), at <https://www.gov.uk/
government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/284393/oft423.pdf> (accessed May 16, 
2015) [hereinafter Penalty guidance].
23  wils, supra n. 18, at 55.
24  strategy development of the Competition and Antimonopoly regulation in the russian Federation in 
2013–24 [Стратегия развития конкуренции и антимонопольного регулирования в РФ на период 
2013–2024 гг. [[Strategiya razvitiya konkurentsii i antimonopol’nogo regulirovaniya v RF na period 2013–
2024 gg.]] ¶ 2.8.1, at <http://www.fas.gov.ru/netcat_files/File/str_razv_konk_i_antimonop_reg_13-
14.pdf> (accessed May 16, 2015) [hereinafter strategy].
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these questions along with the position of the FAs’ officials towards the promotion 
of competition compliance culture in russia will be reviewed in Ch. 5.
the literature review focuses on the key issues surrounding the implementation 
by competition authorities of the Eu, uk and russia of competition compliance 
culture and in deterring anticompetitive behaviour, in particular, through the 
following objectives:
– an exploration of academic and competition authority views and enforcement 
practices related to the compliance programmes;
– an evaluation of models, characteristics and the legal framework relevant to 
recognition by competition authorities of robust compliance programmes;
– an examination of competition legislation of the Eu, uk and russia with 
particular focus on the prohibition of anticompetitive agreements and enforcement 
mechanisms.
the Paper will conclude by formulating a three-step plan, embracing particular 
measures that may be considered rational steps for the FAs to take to ensure 
antimonopoly compliance in russia within the framework of its recently adopted 
strategy. the outline plan suggested in Ch. 6 may be regarded as the next step in 
the development of russian competition law in terms of strengthening competition 
enforcement and deterring cartels in accordance with the best international practices, 
specifically the uk.
2. Background Information: Competition Compliance Culture
discussions by academics, practitioners, state officials, lawyers and business 
on effective compliance programmes essentially frame the research questions 
herein. the key matters under discussion are highlighted above. the purpose of this 
Chapter is to present a background overview of competition compliance to further 
use it in the analysis of the CMA’s competition compliance policy25 and also in the 
discussion with the FAs officials to form a Questionnaire for the Interview.26
2.1. A View on the Robust Compliance Programme
‘the proper role of an antitrust compliance program should be to ensure 
compliance with the law and to promote ethical behaviour by and between 
companies as part of good corporate governance.’27 According to geradin, ‘compliance 
programmes represent a form of competition advocacy.’28
25  See infra, Ch. 4.
26  See infra, Appendix.
27  riley & sokol, supra n. 17, at 1.
28  damien geradin, Antitrust Compliance Programmes and Optimal Antitrust Enforcement: A Reply to 
Wouter Wils, 1(2) Journal of Antitrust Enforcement (2013), available at <http://papers.ssrn.com/
abstract_id=2241452> (accessed May 16, 2015) 7. doi:10.1093/jaenfo/jnt004
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wils argues that ‘compliance programmes only have value [for society] to the extent 
that they have positive effects for the enforcement of the antitrust prohibitions . . .’29 
kolasky states that ‘[a] sound antitrust compliance programme’30 has two key objects: 
prevention of the infringement and detection of wrongdoing at its early stage.31
It is of note that wils argues that it would not be possible for competition authorities and 
courts to reliably investigate at reasonable cost if the company’s compliance programme 
is ‘part of a culture and practice of real compliance’32 or just a ‘symbolic or cosmetic 
compliance.’33 In his view, there is much uncertainty in identifying the characteristics of 
a credible compliance programme that can ensure the real compliance.34
this position appears to be arguable. thus, geradin claims that no programme 
can guarantee an absence of the violation.35 she expresses the view that it would be 
possible for competition authorities to determine whether the compliance programme 
is credible or a ‘pure sham’36 because the investigated company would have to provide 
‘all available evidence,’37 including the access to the company’s documents, to prove 
that the programme is real and ‘the management of the company made its best 
efforts to limit … the risk of infringement.’38 Also, the competition authorities could 
adopt special guidance to identify all the necessary characteristics of the compliance 
programme to be taken into account during its evaluation.39
geradin’s position is obviously supported by the experience of the CMA, which 
has powers and resources to regularly assess the compliance measures undertaken 
by the investigated companies, based, inter alia, on the criteria set out in a special 
guidance, as described in secs. 4.2–4.4 of the Paper.
2.2. The Key Elements of an Effective Compliance Programme
the principal characteristics of a credible compliance programme and their 
expansion are the subject of broad academic discussion.
29  wils, supra n. 18, at 60.
30  william J. kolasky, Antitrust Compliance Programs: The Government Perspective 14, department of 
Justice (Jul. 12, 2002), <http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/224389.pdf> (accessed May 
17, 2015).
31  Id.
32  wils, supra n. 18, at 66.
33  Id. at 67.
34  Id.
35  geradin, supra n. 28, at 10.
36  Id. at 11.
37  Id.
38  Id.
39  Id. at 20.
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Certain authors refer to the lists of elements of effective compliance programmes, 
prepared by the Canadian Competition Bureau and the us sentencing Commission, 
which may contain from five to twelve elements.40 Murphy and Boehme point out 
that ‘all the necessary elements of an effective program need to work together to 
create a meaningful approach to preventing and detecting misconduct . . .’41
Murphy and kolasky elaborated the list to twenty features,42 pointing out that 
an effective compliance programme needs to contain each of these ‘fundamental 
standards,’43 subject to variation of details:
– a periodical risk assessment of cartel conduct occurring;
– ‘clearly articulated’44 standards and policies to prevent cartels (codes of conduct);
– implemented controls to make violations difficult;
– ‘empowered CECO,’45 a senior chief ethics and compliance officer;
– allocation of resources and infrastructure for the programme;
– ‘board oversight;’46
– ‘senior management support;’47
– implementation of ‘diligent personnel practices’48 to prevent delegation of powers 
to employees ‘who may engage in cartels based on prior anti-competitive conduct;’49
– promotion of ‘practical training’50 and ‘result-oriented communication;’51
– institution of ‘auditing and monitoring processes;’52
– implementation of effective ‘reporting systems’53 for employees to report on 
cartel behaviour; and others.54
40  Murphy & Boehme, supra n. 1, at 5; see also kolasky, supra n. 30, at 9; 2014 ussC guidelines Manual 
ch. 8, at <http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/guidelines-manual/2014/ChAPtEr_8.pdf> 
(accessed May 17, 2015).
41  Murphy & Boehme, supra n. 1, at 5.
42  Murphy & kolasky, supra n. 9, at 62.
43  Id.
44  Id.
45  Id.
46  Id.
47  Id.
48  Id.
49  Id.
50  Id.
51  Id.
52  Id.
53  Id.
54  Id.
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If implemented, the above complex of measures would represent an ‘effective 
and aggressive anti-cartel compliance program,’55 which is, according to Murphy and 
kolasky, one of the key weapons in the battle with cartels.56 
the key fundamental standards in general may be regarded as the basis for a 
‘four-step risk-based framework’57 implemented by the CMA to promote a culture of 
competition law compliance, which will be discussed in secs. 4.3–4.4 below.
2.3. Reduction in Fines: Is It Justifiable?
Although many prominent scholars and practitioners advocate providing 
discounted fines for companies that have taken serious steps to implement 
compliance programmes, but have nevertheless failed to prevent infringement, 
others, including the majority of competition authorities, have contrary opinions.
For instance, wils gives ‘sound policy reasons’58 why the Eu and the us competition 
authorities ‘do not, and should not, grant reduction in fines’59 to companies having pre-
existing compliance programmes.60 he argues that a reduction in fines creates ‘perverse 
incentives’61 that provide ‘a cheap insurance policy against antitrust liability.’62
similarly, Mr. Joaquín Almunia,63 voiced the European Commission’s position in 
2010:
[w]hy should I reward a compliance programme that has failed?
the benefit of a compliance programme is that your company reduces the risk that 
it is involved in a cartel in the first place. that is where you earn your reward.64
however, many academics and practitioners hold the position, asserted by 
geradin that robust compliance programmes, which are ‘well designed and 
implemented,’65 should be rewarded because ‘they can contribute to significantly 
reduce antitrust infringements.’66
55  Murphy & kolasky, supra n. 9, at 64.
56  Id.
57  Promoting Compliance with Competition Law ¶ 5, at 186, oECd (Aug. 30, 2012), <http://www.oecd.org/
daf/competition/Promotingcompliancewithcompetitionlaw2011.pdf> (accessed May 17, 2015).
58  geradin, supra n. 28, at 1.
59  Id.
60  Id.
61  wils, supra n. 18, at 68.
62  Id.
63  the Vice President responsible for competition policy of the European Commission.
64  Joaquín Almunia, Compliance and Competition Policy 5–6, European Commission (oct. 25, 2010), 
<http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_sPEECh-10-586_en.pdf> (accessed May 17, 2015).
65  geradin, supra n. 28, at 14.
66  Id.
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stephan notes that the approach of the Eu and us competition authorities 
is flawed since it is ‘characterized by very little engagement with the business 
community . . . to promote enforcement’67 and may not be ‘deterrence-enhancing.’68 
similar, Murphy and kolasky recognise that the above competition authorities ‘have 
not put sufficient emphasis on encouraging companies to implement strong antitrust 
compliance programs to prevent cartel behavior.’69
In light of the above, stephan welcomed the uk’s diverse and progressive 
approach in ‘recognising the importance of compliance and acknowledging that 
the existence of an infringement should not render a firm’s entire compliance 
programme a failure.’70 therefore, the position of the CMA to reduce fines to infringing 
companies based on their compliance efforts is in line with the recent approach of 
many scholars, which is based on the analysis of development of compliance practice 
and cartel enforcement.
2.4. Impediments to Implementing Effective Programmes
stephan asserts that compliance programmes may be ‘ineffective at preventing 
cartel behaviour in the absence of criminal sanctions against individuals’71 responsible for 
cartels,72 as empirical evidence shows these infringements are ‘deliberate, meticulously 
concealed and organised at a senior level.’73 this is similar to wils’s view that the us 
experience in both imposing fines on companies and imprisoning individuals ‘has a 
stronger deterrent and normative effect’74 in comparison to the Eu where criminal 
sanctions for individuals are absent.75 Murphy and Boehme also state that the European 
Commission ‘needs to step up and make hard core collusion criminal.’76
while criminal sanctions may not be imposed at European Community level, 
the uk competition law provides for criminal offences, which though not applied 
67  Andreas stephan, Why the U.K.’s New Approach to Competition Compliance Makes for Good Enforcement, 
2012(1) CPI Antitrust Chronicle 3, available at <http://core.kmi.open.ac.uk/download/pdf/8821351.
pdf> (accessed May 17, 2015) [hereinafter stephan, Approach to Competition Compliance].
68  Id.
69  Murphy & kolasky, supra n. 9, at 61.
70  stephan, Approach to Competition Compliance, supra n. 67, at 5.
71  Andreas stephan, Hear No Evil, See No Evil: Why Antitrust Compliance Programmes May Be Ineffective 
at Preventing Cartels 2 (EsrC Centre for Competition Policy & Norwich Law school, university of East 
Anglia, CCP working Paper 09-09, July 2009), <https://www.uea.ac.uk/polopoly_fs/1.122147!ccp09-
9wp.pdf> (accessed May 17, 2015) [hereinafter stephan, Antitrust Compliance Programmes].
72  Id.
73  Id. at 13.
74  wils, supra n.18, at 72.
75  Id.
76  Murphy & Boehme, supra n. 1, at 10.
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frequently due to certain legislative impediments, nevertheless, may be considered 
as a credible threat to individual cartelists to make the compliance programmes 
more effective.77
2.5. The Importance of Government Support
It is of a particular note that certain authors highlight the important role of 
government in the promotion of development of effective compliance programmes.78 
Combined efforts of the ‘government, industry, academia and others’79 are necessary 
to promote effective compliance.80 riley and sokol claim that antitrust authorities 
should support and encourage antitrust compliance programmes in the same way 
as other enforcement authorities do (i.e. in relation to the Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act) and ‘to engage more fully with academics, compliance and ethics professionals, 
and the business community in such efforts to create a more effective antitrust 
system and better compliance in practice.’81
the particular experience of the uk competition authorities represents an 
example of notable government support and encouragement to businesses of 
implementing competition law compliance culture with the state. ‘this approach 
recognizes the importance of building a competition culture within the British 
economy, beyond simply enforcing the law.’82
3. The EU and UK Approach: Rewarding Compliance
3.1. The European Commission and the CMA: Enforcement of Cartel Prohibitions
3.1.1. The EU Law, Penalties
the powers of the European Commission [hereinafter Commission] to enforce 
Art. 101 of the tFEu,83 a supranational legislation prohibiting anticompetitive 
agreements that affect the trade between the Member states, are set out in Council 
regulation No. 1/2003.84
77  stephan, Antitrust Compliance Programmes, supra n. 71, at 14–15.
78  Murphy & Boehme, supra n. 1, at 11.
79  Id. 
80  Id.
81  riley & sokol, supra n. 17, at 45–46.
82  stephan, Approach to Competition Compliance, supra n. 67, at 4.
83  Consolidated Version of the treaty on the Functioning of the European union, 2008 o.J. (C 115) 13 
[hereinafter tFEu].
84  Council regulation (EC) No. 1/2003 of 16 december 2002 on the Implementation of the rules on 
Competition Laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the treaty, Art. 23(2)(a), 2003 o.J. (L 1) 1, 17.
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the Fining guidelines state that the Commission may impose a fine on an 
undertaking that has participated in a ‘hard core’ cartel agreement to the amount 
of up to 10% of the offender’s annual worldwide turnover.85 In fixing the level of the 
fine, the Commission ‘must have regard both to the gravity and to the duration of 
the infringement,’86 where the gravity of the infringement is determined on a case-
by-case basis.87 the basic amount of the fine determined by the Commission may 
be adjusted depending on the presence of aggravating or mitigating factors.88 the 
Commission has a great discretion in determining the amount of fines by weighting 
all the circumstances and ensuring ‘that fines have a sufficiently deterrent effect.’89
3.1.2. The UK Law: A Brief Overview
on a national level, the CMA has been invested with powers to apply and enforce 
Art. 101 of the tFEu in the uk since May 2004, while before this date it was only a 
prerogative of the Commission.90
the uk competition law was introduced by the Competition Act91 and the 
Enterprise Act,92 which both fundamentally changed the domestic competition 
law of the uk.93
the Chapter I prohibitions of the Competition Act correspond to Art. 101 of the 
tFEu, but refer to anti-competitive practices which affect trade within the united 
kingdom.94
the Enterprise Act supplements the Competition Act, by introducing a criminal 
cartel offence,95 which can lead to the imprisonment of individuals for up to five 
years and / or a fine of an unlimited amount; it also provides for company director 
disqualification and facilitates private actions.96 the Enterprise Act also creates 
Competition Appeal tribunal [hereinafter CAt] that has appellate and judicial review 
85  guidelines on the Method of setting Fines Imposed Pursuant to Article 23(2)(a) of regulation 
No. 1/2003 ¶ 2, 2006 o.J. (C 210) 2, 2 [hereinafter Fining guidelines].
86  Id.
87  richard whish & david Bailey, Competition Law 277 (7th ed., oxford university Press 2012).
88  Fining guidelines, supra n. 85, ¶ 28, at 4.
89  Id. ¶ 30, at 4.
90  Council regulation No. 1/2003 of 16 december 2002, supra n. 84.
91  Competition Act, 1998, c. 41 (Eng.) [hereinafter Competition Act].
92  Enterprise Act, 2002, c. 40 (Eng.) [hereinafter Enterprise Act].
93  whish & Bailey, supra n. 87, at 58.
94  Competition Act, supra n. 91, Ch. I; Penalty guidance, supra n. 22, para. 1.2.
95  Enterprise Act, supra n. 92, sec. 188.
96  whish & Bailey, supra n. 87, at 60.
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functions.97 thus, the uk competition law provides for all types of liability for cartel 
infringement: administrative sanctions – imposition of penalties, criminal liability 
and private actions.
Following the above, the CMA has powers to enforce Eu and uk law prohibiting 
cartels and is authorised to carry out on-the-spot investigations, to adopt decisions 
and to impose penalties on undertakings that have violated the competition law.98
3.1.3. The UK Law: Penalties
Further to the Eu rules, the amount of penalties which may be imposed by the 
CMA on undertakings participating in cartels, may not exceed 10% of an undertaking’s 
worldwide turnover in the business year preceding the CMA’s decision.99
the Penalty guidance sets out the basis on which the CMA calculates the fines.100 
the Penalty guidance provides a six-step approach to determine the level of penalty, 
which, by analogy with the Eu rules, starts from the calculation of a starting point (basic 
amount), which then adjusted in accordance with particular criteria in subsequent 
steps, such as the duration of an infringement, aggravating or mitigating circumstances 
and other factors, including the need for deterrence and proportionality.101
It is of note that in the uk, fines may be reduced by the CMA for mitigating 
factors, which, alongside certain factors mirroring Eu Fining guidelines, also include 
‘adequate steps having been taken with a view to ensuring compliance.’102
As discussed in this Chapter, the CMA has broad powers to enforce competition 
law, prohibiting cartel agreements (both supranational and domestic legislation) and 
to determine the amount of penalties imposed on the offenders. while in general the 
norms of the Competition Act and Penalty guidance mirror the respective Eu rules, 
the uk is significantly different in the formulation of mitigating circumstances, which 
embrace compliance efforts, and is a key legal mechanism ensuring the rewarding 
of companies for their compliance efforts.
3.2. The European Commission and the CMA: Rewarding Compliance 
Programmes
the Commission is not obliged to take into account the compliance programme 
of a company when defining the level of fines.103
97  Enterprise Act, supra n. 92, Pt. 2.
98  whish & Bailey, supra n. 87, at 59.
99  Competition Act, supra n. 91, sec. 36(8).
100  Penalty guidance, supra n. 22, para. 1.4.
101 Id., para. 2.1.
102 Id., para. 2.15.
103  whish & Bailey, supra n. 87, at 279.
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In the 1980s, the Commission, in certain circumstances, reduced the level of a fine 
imposed on a company after recognising a compliance programme as a mitigating 
factor, but has adopted a harder approach in recent cases, stating that attempts at 
compliance do not change the reality of the infringement.104 this change of policy and 
the new position of the Commission was upheld by the European Court of Justice.105
this approach has been questioned, with academics and practitioners claiming 
that it ‘arguably overlooks the positive incentive effect of rewarding good faith 
attempts at compliance.’106
while Eu law and the enforcement practice of the Commission is followed by the 
majority of Member states’ competition authorities, the uk competition authority 
‘significantly diverged in its approach to business compliance’107 regularly rewarding 
firms with robust compliance programmes by reducing the fines; up to 10% in certain 
circumstances.108
the next Chapter will review in more detail the respective mechanisms and 
principles embedded in national competition law by the CMA with the purpose of 
instilling the competition culture within the state.
4. The UK Approach: Rewarding Compliance
the legacy of CMA’s predecessor – the oFt, in particular in terms of embedding 
compliance programmes into the competition law in the uk, is of a particular interest. 
this Chapter will discuss complex measures undertaken by the oFt in this respect. 
Although the publications, decisions and actions discussed in this Chapter were 
developed under the name of the oFt, the name of its legal successor – the CMA 
will be used.
4.1. CMA’s Guidance: Instilling the Competition Culture
the CMA considers that ‘most businesses wish to comply with competition 
law’109 and aims to support them, and has issued a number of publications to help 
businesses to achieve this goal and promote the competition culture.
104  oliver geiss, Belgium: Countering Competition Risks: Towards a Culture of Compliance, Mondaq (Jan. 3, 
2012), <http://www.mondaq.com/x/154068/Antitrust+Competition/Countering+Competition+ris
ks+towards+A+Culture+of> (accessed May 17, 2015).
105  Case t-13/03, Nintendo v. Commission, ¶¶ 74, 211, 2009 E.C.r. II-947, [2009] 5 C.M.L.r. 1421 (2009); 
see also geiss, supra n. 104.
106  geiss, supra n. 104; see also stephan, Approach to Competition Compliance, supra n. 67; Murphy & 
Boehme, supra n. 1; sokol, supra n. 20.
107  stephan, Approach to Competition Compliance, supra n. 67, at 2.
108  wils, supra n. 18, at 55.
109  Promoting Compliance with Competition Law, supra n. 57, ¶ 11, at 191.
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In 2005, the CMA issued a quick guide, ‘how your Business Can Achieve Compliance’ 
(oFt 424), which promotes compliance programmes as a necessary mechanism, sets 
out certain general characteristics for an effective compliance programme and states 
that the existence of a compliance programme in an infringing business might be 
taken into account as mitigating circumstances when calculating the fines.110
this guide was further elaborated into a new guidance in 2011: ‘how your 
Business Can Achieve Compliance with Competition Law,’111 which explains, inter 
alia, the view of the CMA on ‘a business’ compliance efforts when setting the level 
of any penalty for competition law infringement.’112
A special word should be said about the CMA’s report ‘drivers of Compliance and 
Non-Compliance with Competition Law’113 published in May 2010. this research was 
undertaken with involvement of deloitte ‘in order to gain a better understanding of 
the practical challenges faced by the business seeking to achieve a competition law 
compliance culture.’114 the report was based on the results of qualitative research as 
to what motivates business to comply with competition law and shows examples 
of compliance activities of the business.
Another guidance, ‘Company directors and Competition Law,’115 was issued in 
2011 to set out the key issues that company directors should be aware of, such as 
main competition law risks, how they may be minimised to prevent infringements 
of competition law and potential sanctions to be imposed on directors.116
the complex of measures undertaken by the CMA, evidenced by the number 
of published guidances, the in-depth research conducted to identify drivers for 
businesses to comply with the competition law and the spreading of awareness 
of competition law by placing interactive materials and films on its website, clearly 
‘demonstrate a pro-business commitment to helping and incentivizing firms to 
prevent infringements rather than simply waiting to dish out punishment once an 
infringement has taken place.’117 In those cases where these measures could not help 
to prevent infringement, the CMA will consider a reduction in fines.
110  drivers of Compliance and Non-Compliance with Competition Law: An oFt report para. 2.15 (oFt 
2010), at <https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/284405/
oft1227.pdf> (accessed May 17, 2015) [hereinafter oFt report].
111  how your Business Can Achieve Compliance with Competition Law: guidance (oFt 2011), at <https://
www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/284402/oft1341.pdf> 
(accessed May 17, 2015) [hereinafter Compliance guidance].
112  Id. para. 1.3.
113  oFt report, supra n. 110.
114  Id. para. 1.3.
115  Company directors and Competition Law: oFt guidance (oFt 2011), at <https://www.gov.uk/
government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/284410/oft1340.pdf> (accessed May 
17, 2015).
116  Promoting Compliance with Competition Law, supra n. 57, ¶ 7, at 187.
117  stephan, Approach to Competition Compliance, supra n. 67, at 4.
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4.2. CMA’s Approach: Conditions for Rewarding Compliance Efforts
In their Compliance guidance, the CMA states that, at its complete discretion and 
depending upon the circumstances, it may reduce a fine imposed on a company for 
a competition law infringement, by up to 10% where it is satisfied that ‘adequate 
steps have been taken’118 towards ensuring competition law compliance.119
what is important is that the CMA clarifies that any discount, if justified, can 
be granted on the basis of compliance efforts taking place either prior to the 
infringement or ‘implemented quickly following the business first becoming aware 
of the potential competition infringement.’120
the CMA says that its ‘starting point in relation to penalty setting . . . is neutral: 
there are no automatic discounts or increases in the level of financial penalty . . .’121 
however, it will carefully consider whether the evidence presented as to a company’s 
compliance activities merits a discount from the fine of up to 10%.122
the assessment of whether a reduction in the amount of fine is justified is to be 
done by CMA on a case-by-case basis and ‘[e]ach case will be assessed on its own 
merits.’123 the CMA clarifies that the mere existence of a competition compliance 
programme will not be regarded as an aggravating factor to increase the fine, subject 
to certain circumstances.124 the mere existence of compliance activities will not be 
regarded as mitigating factors.125
the CMA asserts that a ‘one size fits all’126 approach is not appropriate for 
competition law compliance where actions to achieve a compliance culture will 
vary ‘by size of business and also by the nature of the risks identified.’127
It is worth saying that though the CMA adopted the policy to reduce fines 
to companies that showed diligent compliance efforts, it also highlighted the 
substantial level of its discretionary power when deciding on discounts, such as 
taking a decision on a case-by-case basis, assessment of adequate steps and looking 
at a particular case on its own merits amongst others. the particular steps of the 
evaluation will be discussed in the next sections.
118  Compliance guidance, supra n. 111, para. 1.6, ch. 7.
119  Id.
120  Id. para. 7.2.
121  Id. para. 7.1.
122  Penalty guidance, supra n. 22, at 12 n. 26.
123  Compliance guidance, supra n. 111, para. 7.3.
124  Id. para. 7.5.
125  Penalty guidance, supra n. 22, at 12 n. 26.
126  Compliance guidance, supra n. 111, para. 1.2.
127  Id.
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4.3. CMA: Assessment of Adequate Steps to Ensure Compliance
the CMA has expressed its willingness to provide discounts to companies which 
can demonstrate that they have taken ‘adequate steps’128 to ensure the compliance 
with competition law. this begs the question as to which particular actions may be 
considered by the CMA as adequate steps performed by the companies. In other 
words, as discussed earlier, which particular characteristics of a formal compliance 
programme could ensure the effective compliance with competition law in the view 
of the CMA to justify a reduction in fines?129
the CMA provides an answer in the Compliance guidance where it states that 
‘[t]aking “adequate steps” for these purposes may include having implemented the 
four-step process described in this guidance or, in the oFt’s view, reasonably equivalent 
measures’130 (emphasis added). the CMA clarifies that reasonably equivalent measures 
may include a risk-based competition law compliance programme.131
the four-step process is as follows:
•  Core – Commitment to Compliance (from the top down). An essential part of the 
process is ‘achieving a clear and unambiguous commitment to competition 
law throughout the organisation;’132
•  Step 1 – Risk identification. the first step to be taken by a business is ‘to 
identify the key competition law risks.’133 these risks might be specific to the 
business’ operations and depend upon the nature and size of the business in 
question;134
•  Step 2 – Risk assessment. the second step assumes an assessment by the 
company of a level of risks identified in step 1;135
•  Step 3 – Risk mitigation. the third step to be performed by the company is 
to properly mitigate its identified risks by implementing suitable training 
activities, procedures and policies to prevent these risks from occurring within 
the company;136
•  Step 4 – Review. the fourth step purports that the company regularly reviews 
all stages of the process, which is not static and should be adapted to any 
changes.137
128  Compliance guidance, supra n. 111, para. 1.6.
129  wils, supra n. 18, at 68.
130  Compliance guidance, supra n. 111, para. 7.2.
131  Id.
132  Id. paras. 1.15, 7.3.
133  Id. paras. 1.15, 3.1.
134  Id. para. 1.15.
135  Id. para. 4.1.
136  Id. para. 5.1.
137  Promoting Compliance with Competition Law, supra n. 57, ¶ 5, at 186.
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the CMA ‘makes it clear that this risk-based process is merely suggestive’138 and 
the business may implement its own compliance measures, which must ensure the 
effective compliance culture within the business.139
we can conclude that the answer to the question about particular characteristics 
of an effective compliance programme is highlighted in the Penalty guidance where 
the CMA states that in a particular case
evidence of adequate steps having been taken to achieve a clear and 
unambiguous commitment to competition law compliance throughout the 
organisation (from the top down) – together with appropriate steps relating 
to competition law risk identification, risk assessment, risk mitigation and 
review activities – will likely be treated as mitigating factor.140
however, there is a view that a more formalised assessment of compliance 
programmes by competition authority is necessary.141 this appraisal should have a 
variety of concessions available in order to properly reflect the variance in compliance 
measures, which may be implemented by the companies.142
4.4. CMA Enforcement: Reduction in Fines
In the past decade, the CMA has granted compliance discounts in many of the 
cases where it penalised the companies for infringement of competition law.143 two 
prominent decisions in recent years include the Construction Recruitment Forum 
decision144 where CMA imposed a fine of £39.27 million on companies engaged in 
price-fixing and collective boycotting, and the Construction Bid-Rigging decision145 
with a total fine of £129.2 million levied on 103 companies involved in unlawful 
cover-pricing and bid-rigging activities.146
138  Promoting Compliance with Competition Law, supra n. 57, ¶ 6, at 187.
139  Compliance guidance, supra n. 111, para. 1.14.
140  Penalty guidance, supra n. 22, at 12 n. 26.
141  stephan, Approach to Competition Compliance, supra n. 67, at 5.
142  Id.
143  From earlier cases (Arriva/First Group, Case CA98/9/2002) to more recent cases (Tobacco, Case 
CA98/01/2010; Dairy Retail Price Initiatives, Case CA98/03/2011). wils, supra n. 18, at 55 n. 11.
144  Construction Recruitment Forum, oFt decision CA98/01/2009, Case CE/7510-06 (september 29, 
2009), available at <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140402142426/http://www.oft.
gov.uk/shared_oft/ca98_public_register/decisions/CE7510-06_decision_290909_N1.pdf> (accessed 
May 17, 2015).
145  Bid Rigging in the Construction Industry in England, oFt decision CA98/2/2009, Case CE/4327-04 
(september 21, 2009), available at <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140402142426/
http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/business_leaflets/general/CE4327-04_decision__public_1.pdf> 
(accessed May 17, 2015).
146  whish & Bailey, supra n. 87, at 553.
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4.4.1. Construction Recruitment Forum
In the Construction Recruitment Forum case, the CMA imposed penalties on 
seven companies engaged in the supply of recruitment services to the construction 
industry in the uk.147 three companies appealed against the amount of the penalty 
imposed, challenging common elements of CMA’s penalty calculation under the 
Penalty guidance in the CAt.148
It is of particular interest that the penalty amount appealed against by the 
companies had already been adjusted by a 5% reduction provided by the CMA 
on the basis that these companies adequately demonstrated ‘that they have 
taken appropriately active measures to introduce compliance measures that are 
appropriate to the size of the company . . .’149 Nevertheless, one of the appellants, Hays 
plc required a higher reduction in fines – 10%, arguing that it provided evidence ‘of 
the full and detailed compliance programme that it subsequently put in place’150
Based on the above, CAt set out that it did not see any features that warranted a 
larger reduction in fines.151 Moreover, CAt supported the position of the CMA ‘that it is not 
required to carry out the detailed evaluation of an undertaking’s compliance measures, 
which would be disproportionate’152 to CMA’s task of calculating penalties.153 CAt upheld 
the position of oFt and dismissed Hays’ appeal, stating that the CMA ‘granted a modest 
penalty reduction appropriate to the compliance measures implemented subsequent 
to the investigation’154 and stated that companies ‘should be incentivised to adopt strong 
compliance measures before any infringement occurs.’155
In conclusion, appeals of all three companies were dismissed and they were 
provided with the ‘modest’156 reduction of fines (5%) for their compliance efforts. 
Nevertheless, the total fines imposed on each of these companies were significantly 
reduced by the CMA on account of leniency.157
147  Construction Recruitment Forum, supra n. 144.
148  Eden Brown Limited v. Office of Fair Trading, [2011] C.A.t. 8, available at <http://www.catribunal.org.
uk/files/1140-42_recruitment_Judgment_010411_2.pdf> (accessed May 17, 2015).
149  Construction Recruitment Forum, supra n. 144, para. 5.337; Eden Brown Limited v. Office of Fair Trading, 
supra n. 148, para. 122.
150  Eden Brown Limited v. Office of Fair Trading, supra n. 148, para. 123.
151  Id. para. 127.
152  Id. para. 129.
153  Id.
154  Id. para. 127.
155  Id.
156  Id.
157  Eden Brown Limited v. Office of Fair Trading, supra n. 148, para. 130.
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Summarising comments. the above decisions of the CMA and CAt appear to 
demonstrate the very rational position where CMA provides a larger discount of 
10% to companies that have adopted diligent compliance programmes before the 
infringement, despite having failed, and a smaller discount of 5% – to companies 
that adopted compliance measures after the infringement had occurred.
Also, the view by the CMA that its evaluation of compliance measures should 
not be disproportionate to its task of setting penalties, represents a limitation of 
the CMA’s investigative efforts in order to maintain reasonable investigative costs 
and timeframe.
4.4.2. Bid Rigging in the Construction Industry in England
In the Bid Rigging in the Construction Industry in England case158 the CMA, following 
a detailed evaluation, was satisfied with submissions by around 80 companies (out 
of 103 companies), evidencing their existing compliance policies.159 CMA stressed 
that companies had ‘adequately demonstrated that they have taken positive steps 
to introduce a formal compliance policy that is appropriate for the size of the 
undertaking . . . and to ensure that all appropriate staff have been properly aware 
of their competition law obligations.’160 For these companies the CMA provided 
a 5–10% reduction of the penalty,161 assuming that they these companies ‘have 
successfully minimised the likelihood of future infringement’162 by introducing such 
programmes.163
Summarising comments. Following the above decisions, we can conclude that two 
major factors are considered by the CMA as sufficient evidence of robust compliance 
programmes: the introduction of a formal compliance policy that is appropriate to 
the size of a business, and proper awareness of the company’s staff of their obligation 
under competition law. It appears that the above criteria are broad enough to follow 
the stages described in the four-step approach,164 or be considered as reasonably 
equivalent measures, in order to be used by the CMA as a general basis for evaluation 
of compliance programmes.
the details of the CMA’s assessment of compliance efforts are not revealed in 
the investigation and the CMA has stipulated reasonable limitations in its appraisal 
of compliance programmes. given a substantial level of the CMA’s discretionary, 
158  Bid Rigging in the Construction Industry in England, supra n. 145.
159  Id. para. VI.317.
160  Id.
161  Id. para. VI.318.
162  Id.
163  Id.
164  See supra, sec. 4.3.
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this may create some extent of uncertainty for companies seeking a reduction 
in fines, and in general weaken the incentives for companies to put recourses in 
implementing compliance programmes.
the experience of the CMA may be of particular interest for other antitrust 
authorities, which have the intention to build a competition culture in jurisdictions 
with less developed competition law than in the uk. the next Chapter considers the 
FAs implementation of mechanisms and deterrents and asks whether the uk concept 
of recognition of benefits of compliance programmes, if implemented in russia, could 
increase the effectiveness and the deterrent effect of russian competition regime.
5. Russia: On the Way to Rewarding Compliance Programmes
In order to consider possible mechanisms and the driving forces in the compliance 
which can be applied by the FAs within the russian antimonopoly legislation, it 
is necessary to have a brief overview of russian antimonopoly laws, addressing 
questions of the regulation the cartels in russia and the imposition of sanctions for 
committed violations. 
5.1. Overview of the Russian Antimonopoly Law and Competition Authorities
5.1.1. Competition Law
According to the head of the FAs, Mr. Igor yu. Artemiev, ‘[t]he russian Federation 
has entered the second decade 21st century with an effective state policy relating to 
the development of competition and the institutional infrastructure for antimonopoly 
regulation and effective legislation on sanctions for the restriction of competition, 
as well as formed judicial practice.’165
russia has taken a fast development path in antimonopoly legislation since the 
1990s, matching the serious transition in russia from prevailing state regulation 
to the market economy and recognition at the political level of the benefits of the 
competition. An important step in this direction was the adoption of a new competition 
law in 2006166 and, later, in 2007, the relevant changes in the Administrative Code,167 
165  Алешин Д.А., Артемьев И.Ю., Башлаков-Николаев И.В. и др. Конкурентное право России: Учебник 
[Aleshin d.A., Artem’ev I.yu., Bashlakov-Nikolaev I.B. i dr. Konkurentnoe pravo Rossii: Uchebnik [dmitry 
A. Aleshin et al. Competition Law of russia: textbook]] 44 (Igor yu. Artemiev et al., eds.) (2nd ed., 
Publishing house of the higher school of Economics 2014).
166  Federal Law No. 135-FZ of July 26, 2006, ‘on Protection of the Competition’ [Федеральный закон 
от 26 июля 2006 г. № 135-ФЗ «o защите конкуренции» [Federal’nyi zakon ot 26 iyulya 2006 g. 
‘O zashchite konkurentsii’]] [hereinafter Competition Law].
167  Federal Law No. 195-FZ of december 30, 2001, ‘Code of the russian Federation on Administrative 
offenses’ [«Кодекс Российской Федерации об административных правонарушениях» от 30 де- 
кабря 2001 г. № 195-ФЗ [‘Kodeks Rossiiskoi Federatsii ob administrativnykh pravonarusheniyakh’ 
ot 30 dekyabrya 2001 g. No. 195-FZ]], Art. 14.32 [hereinafter Administrative Code].
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which for the first time established turnover fines for infringement of the antimonopoly 
legislation. to date, the Competition Law, with significant changes adopted in 2009, 
2012,168 is the principal document, containing substantial and procedural competition 
law rules in russia.
the russian antimonopoly legislation is complex by its nature and includes 
the rules of administrative, civil and procedural law. Apart from the Competition 
Law, antimonopoly legislation includes, inter alia, the rules of Administrative Code, 
governmental and Presidential decrees, normative legal acts of the FAs relating to 
the protection of the competition.169 there is a significant influence on the practice 
of application of antimonopoly legislation provided by judicial practice.
the russian antimonopoly legislation is in constant development, through 
the initiative of the FAs making significant changes practically every three years. 
A number of new changes to the antimonopoly laws, the so called ‘the fourth 
antimonopoly package’170 is due for adoption in the spring of 2015.171
It is of note that ‘it is the European supranational competition law has been the 
basis for russian legislation,’172 the russian antimonopoly legislation evolving to keep 
pace with European legislation, as well as global trends, based on a best judicial and 
administrative practice of the leading antimonopoly authorities of the world.173
5.1.2. Liability for Breaching the Antimonopoly Legislation
while russian legislation provides all types of liability in order to protect 
competition, such as, civil-law, administrative and criminal liability, the prevailing 
administrative sanctions remain the most effective, imposed on individuals 
and businesses in the form of fines (including turnover fines for the latter) and 
disqualification of persons in a professional capacity.174 the administrative legislation 
168  Changes were called as the second and the third competition packets.
169  Aleshin et al., supra n. 165, at 63.
170  Проект федерального закона «o внесении изменений в Федеральный закон «o защите 
конкуренции» и отдельные законодательные акты Российской Федерации» [Proekt federal’nogo 
zakona ‘O vnesenii izmenenii v Federal’nyi zakon “O zashchite konkurentsii” i otdel’nye zakonodatel’nye 
akty Rossiiskoi Federatsii’ [draft Federal Law ‘on Amending the Federal Law “on Protection of 
Competition” and the separate Legislative Acts of the russian Federation’]], at <http://fas.gov.ru/
legislative-acts/legislative-acts_51214.html> (accessed May 17, 2015).
171  Титов C. Правительство одобрило поправки ФАС в закон о защите конкуренции [titov s. 
Pravitel’stvo odobrilo popravki FAS v zakon o zashchite konkurentsii [sergey titov, The Government 
Has Approved Amendments of FAS to the Competition Law]], Vedomosti (sep. 4, 2014), <http://www.
vedomosti.ru/politics/news/33007501/pravitelstvo-odobrilo-popravki-fas-v-zakon-o-zaschite> 
(accessed May 17, 2015).
172  Aleshin et al., supra n. 165, at 37.
173  Id. at 44.
174  Administrative Code, Arts. 14.9, 14.31–14.33, 19.5, 19.8.
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does have a Leniency Programme for companies which voluntarily admit their 
participation in a cartel.175
It is worth noting that along with the existing institute of civil protection of 
the rights, the norms of criminal law are rarely used in relation to antimonopoly 
violations and remain in fact dormant.176
5.1.3. The Russian Competition Authority
the system of the antimonopoly bodies in russia consists of the federal executive 
authority – the FAs, which is under the control of the russian government, and its 
territorial network of antimonopoly bodies.177 According to the rate list of the Global 
Competition Review magazine the FAs is included in the top twenty antimonopoly 
authorities of the world.178
the FAs is vested with the key authority to initiate, consider and impose sanctions 
for the violation of antimonopoly legislation, to issue binding orders, to apply for 
arbitration with the claims and statements on any violations of the antimonopoly 
legislation, amongst other things.179
while FAs tended to use preventive measures in the fight against violations, in 
the view of Mr. Artemiev, thanks to changes of the proposed ‘fourth antimonopoly 
package,’ FAs will transform from a body, that punishes for violations of the 
competition law into the ‘authority of the warning control.’180
the FAs has power and competency in relation to the control and supervision of 
the execution of the legislation and regularly develops and implements significant 
changes in antimonopoly laws, by raising it to a new level. however, the downside is that 
initiatives of the FAs can stall through confrontation with russian business and criticism 
by government experts in matters relating to excessive regulation of the business.
175 Administrative Code, Art. 14.32 (note).
176  According to the supreme Court of russia, for the period 2010 – first half of the 2012 only 3 
individuals had been condemned by the courts under Art. 178 of the Criminal Code of the russian 
Federation. Note that only for the year 2012 the FAs had identified 89 cartels. See Разъяснение ФАС 
России о проекте федерального закона «o внесении изменений в статью 178 Уголовного кодекса 
Российской Федерации» [Raz’yasnenie FAS Rossii o proekte federal’nogo zakona ‘O vnesenii izmenenii v 
stat’yu 178 Ugolovnogo kodeksa Rossiiskoi Federatsii’ [Explanation of FAS in Relation to the Draft Federal 
Law ‘On Applying Amendments to Article 178 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation’]], Anticartel 
(Jun. 17, 2013), <http://anticartel.ru/article/1040> (accessed May 17, 2015).
177  Гаврилов Д.А., Пузыревский С.А., Серегин Д.И. Конкурентное право: Учебник [gavrilov d.A., 
Puzyrevskiy, seregin d.I. Konkurentnoe pravo [denis A. gavrilov et al., Competition Law: textbook]] 
295 (Norma; INFrA-M 2014).
178  Id. at 78.
179  Competition Law, Art. 23.
180  Глава ФАС надеется, что четвертый антимонопольный пакет будет принят до конца 2014 г. [Glava 
FAS nadeetsya, chto chetvertyi antimonopolnyi paket budet prinyat do kontsa 2014 g. [Head of the FAS 
Hopes That the Fouth Antimonopoly Package Will Be Adopted before the End of 2014]], rBC (Mar. 4, 2014), 
<http://www.rbc.ru/rbcfreenews/20140304195358.shtml> (accessed May 17, 2015).
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5.1.4. Regulation of Cartel Agreements
As it was noted by Mr. Artemiev, cartels are clogging the large number of the 
industries of the russian economy.181 socially valuable industry – food products, 
pharmaceuticals, utilities market, as well as the government procurement and bid 
rigging, are closely monitored by the FAs and are priority in its work.182
the norms of Art. 11 of the Competition Law prohibiting cartels in fact are similar 
to the rules of Art. 101(1) of the tFEu; the difference being that the definition of the 
Competition Act contains the term ‘cartel’ and expands the scope of prohibited per 
se agreements to include boycotting of the buyers or the sellers of the goods. At the 
same time, the range of the agreements, which are identified in the Competition 
Law, in contrast to the European norms, does not include agreements of buyers 
(purchasers of the goods), which may not be recognised as cartels and do not fall 
in the number of per se prohibitions.183
the imposition of fines on infringing companies (from 1 to 15% of the sales revenue 
of the company-offender for the previous year in the market, where the infringement 
took place, but not more than 4% of the total turnover of the company-offender)184 was 
introduced in 2007, by analogy with the norms of the European legislation.
the deputy head of FAs, Mr. Alexander yu. kinyov said that in 2010 FAs initiated 
the maximum number of cases against participants in cartels, no fewer than 600.185 
In 2011 this number decreased to 500, and in 2012 to less than 300 cases, 40% less 
in comparison to the previous year.186 FAs explains this positive tendency as the 
improvement of the quality of consideration by FAs of the existing cases, a focus 
on the larger cases, impacting at the federal level.187
At the same time, there has been an increase in the number of persons brought 
to account. where previously there were 2–3 participants involved in a cartel 
agreement, lately it was not rare to find cases with 20–30 participants. the number 
of persons liable for cartel agreements is growing – with 1500 companies in 2012; 
consequently the total amount of the fines is also growing, amounting to more than 
3 billion rubles in 2012.188
181  Кинёв А.Ю. Противодействие картелям. Итоги, проблемы, перспективы [kinyov A.yu. Protivodeistvie 
kartelyam. Itogi, problemy, perspectivy [Alexander yu. kinyov, The Opposition to Cartels. The Results, 
Problems, Prospects]], garant (Mar. 15, 2013), <http://www.garant.ru/action/interview/462523/> 
(accessed May 17, 2015).
182  Id.
183  FAs has proposed amendments to the Competition Law, which include the notion of cartel 
agreements between purchasers, that will lead to compliance with the existing practice in the Eu 
and the us in the case of adoption of such changes.
184  Administrative Code, Arts. 14.32(1), 3.5(4).
185  kinyov, supra n. 181.
186  Id.
187  Id.
188  Id. the amount equals to us$98.7 million at the exchange rate as of december 30, 2012.
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the growing number of participants in cartels appears to demonstrate, inter alia, 
insufficient awareness of competition law prohibitions by businesses necessitating 
FAs to undertake measures to increase such awareness among businesses to prevent 
cartels in russia.
5.2. The Status of Competition Compliance in Russia
we have come to the question of what compliance culture is in russia today, and 
also what problems FAs may encounter when implementing such a culture through 
the compliance programmes.
It would not be an exaggeration to say that the term ‘antimonopoly compliance’ 
only recently appeared in russia and was first publicly voiced by the FAs occurring 
in the strategy, a special programme ‘the strategy of the development of the 
Competition and Antimonopoly regulation in the russian Federation in 2013–
24.’189 thus, under the framework of the priority activities of FAs for the creation of 
‘[a] favorable institutional and organizational environment for the effective protection 
and development of competition,’190 the strategy defines one of the challenges of the 
FAs over the next ten years as follows: ‘to develop and implement a set of measures 
with regards to the advocacy of antimonopoly compliance – one of the ways to 
reduce the risk of violating the antimonopoly legislation.’191 As noted by FAs, the 
strategy takes into account the recommendations of the Competition Committee of 
the organisation for Economic Co-operation and development [hereinafter oECd], 
given to the FAs.192 the strategy also includes the term ‘compliance’ in the very same 
context, which is used by the competition authorities of the us, Eu and the uk.
In March 2014, the annual conference of the International Compliance Association 
hosted – ‘Compliance in russia: the International Context’ where the head of the 
Legal department of FAs Mr. Puzyrevsky, ‘noted the importance of the procedure 
of compliance for the purposes of preventing violations of the antimonopoly 
legislation. he also suggested that the participants in the Conference formulate 
proposals to improve mechanisms for changes in the legislation of russia.’193 this 
marks a new openness and readiness of the antimonopoly authority to hear the 
voices of various experts, and, furthermore, to facilitate the necessary changes in 
legislation for the introduction of compliance culture in russia.
189  strategy, supra n. 24.
190  Id. at 4.
191  Id. ¶ 2.8.1.
192  Id. at 4.
193  Сергей Пузыревский принял участие в Ежегодной конференции ICA «Комплаенс в России: 
международный контекст» [Sergey Puzyrevsky prinyal uchastie v Ezhegodnoi konferentsii ICA 
‘Komplaens v Rossii: mezhdunarodnyi kontekst’ [Sergey Puzyrevsky Took Part in the Annual Conference 
ICA ‘Compliance in Russia: The International Context’]], FAs (Mar. 20, 2014), <http://www.fas.gov.ru/
fas-news/fas-news_35350.html> (accessed May 17, 2015).
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5.3. Antimonopoly Compliance in the Corporate Codes of Russian Companies
In spite of all of the above, antimonopoly compliance as a single system of 
measures in the development of the competition culture in russia remains for the 
business community an unexplored area in respect of which there is no unified 
understanding. the russian legislation does not have an official definition of 
compliance, which appeared in russian practice only with the arrival of foreign 
companies, for whom compliance is an integral part of their activities.194 thus, the 
culture of consolidating certain rules of compliance with laws and ethical standards 
in the codes of conduct has safely moved into russian business practice and has 
become almost a norm for large russian companies.
In connection with the above, it is fairly important to analyse the content of the 
corporate codes of russian companies for the inclusion of provisions on compliance 
with antimonopoly law. this research will have made it possible to a large extent, 
reflecting the significance to date of the understanding within russian business of 
the incorporation of the antimonopoly rules in the internal corporate compliance 
programmes.
the author of Paper used for the analysis the codes located in the web sites of 
the fifty (50) russian public companies,195 acting in the various areas of the economy: 
banking, telecommunications, metallurgical engineering industry, the automotive 
industry, energy, oil and the gas industry. the results have shown that only in one 
code of conduct compliance with antimonopoly legislation was highlighted in a 
separate chapter, providing a detailed description of proper conduct of company’s 
personnel to avoid violation.196 this does not preclude however the possibility that 
certain requirements on the observance of the norms of antimonopoly legislation 
may be incorporated in other internal documents of the above-mentioned 
companies, not publicly available.197
194  Конференция «Комплаенс для юристов: управление рисками на уровне юридической 
службы или как использовать риски на пользу компании» [Konferentsiya ‘Komplaens dlya 
yuristov: upravlenie riskami na urovne yuridicheskoi sluzhby ili kak ispolzovat’ riski na pol’zu kompanii’ 
[Conference ‘The Compliance for the Legal Professionals: The Management of the Risks at the Level of 
Legal Service, or How to Use Risks at the Benefit of the Company]], Ob’edinenie Korporativnykh Yuristov 
(OKYuR) [union of Corporate Lawyers (uCL)] (sep. 24, 2010), <http://www.rcca.com.ru/news/action1.
shtml?grid=2&id=107> (accessed May 17, 2015).
195  the list of companies includes: oJsC ‘Bank of Moscow;’ oJsC ‘gazprom;’ oJsC ‘Aeroflot;’ oJsC ‘Mts;’ 
oJsC ‘urALsIB;’ oJsC ‘Ingosstrakh;’ oJsC ‘oil Company “rosneft”;’ oJsC ‘Avtodom;’ oJsC ‘tatneft;’ oJsC 
‘Power Machines – ZtL, LMZ, Electrosila, Energomashexport;’ oJsC ‘severstal-Auto;’ oJsC ‘gazprom 
Neft;’ oJsC ‘oil Company “LukoIL”;’ oJsC ‘rostelecom;’ oJsC ‘sberbank of russia;’ oJsC ‘Ngk “slavneft”;’ 
oJsC ‘Novolipetsk steel;’ oJsC ‘kusbassenergo;’ oJsC ‘sibirtelecom;’ oJsC ‘Magnitogorsk Iron and 
steel works;’ oJsC ‘sIBur holding;’ oJsC ‘the seventh Continent;’ and others.
196  Code of Corporate Ethics of oJsC ‘sIBur holding’ (version No. 2) [Кодекс корпоративной этики ОАО 
«СИБУР Холдинг» (редакция № 2) [Kodeks korporativnoi etiki OAO ‘SIBUR Holding’ (redaktsiya No. 2)]] 
(adopted March 25, 2013), sec. 6 <http://investors.sibur.com/~/media/Files/s/sibur-Ir/corporate-
documents-rus/code-of-corporate-ethics-rus-25-03-2013.pdf> (ассessed May 17, 2015).
197  For example, oJsC ‘oil Company “LukoIL”’ has developed the ‘rules of the tendering Process for 
Choosing suppliers and Contractors,’ which is to ensure the compliance with, inter alia, antimonopoly 
regulations.
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however, the available policies, analysed in the framework of the present study 
clearly show that the implementation of the antimonopoly compliance programmes 
in russian business is at the very early stages of development.
5.4. The View of the Russian Competition Authorities on Compliance Perspectives
As discussed above, the support of the state authorities is a critical component in 
the promotion and implementation of certain ideas or programmes. Bearing in mind 
that the sources of information in regard to the development of the antimonopoly 
compliance in russia were very limited and inadequate, it was very important for 
the author of the Paper to get information from the officials of FAs, competent in the 
development of compliance in accordance with the strategy. It was also an important 
step in order to find out the position of FAs, what feasibly could be implemented into 
russian legislation and business practices from the best international experience and 
what the opinion and strategy of FAs in russia was, and whether it would require 
an entirely different approach, taking into account the russian legal consciousness 
and the concrete realities of russian market.
to this end, face-to-face interviews were held with the head of the Legal 
department of FAs, Mr. sergey A. Puzyrevsky, and the deputy head of the Legal 
department of FAs, Mr. denis A. gavrilov, in Moscow, russia, on July 15, 2014. this 
section includes the conducted Interview and reflects the position of the above-
mentioned persons as FAs representatives on the matters, formulated by the author 
in the Questionnaire198 with a view to further study on the stated topic. the following 
text is not a direct transcript, except for the phrases indicated as such. It is as close as 
possible to the original expression of the views and positions of representatives of 
FAs. the questions listed below as subtitles reflect the parts of the Questionnaire.
5.4.1. The History of the Question
According to FAs, the question regarding the implementation of antimonopoly 
compliance in russian companies is still at the stage of discussion and has been 
for approximately the past five years, since the initial familiarisation with this term 
from the usA. the representatives of the Ministry of Justice of the united states 
and American law firms pointed to this preventive mechanism as being successfully 
applied in the legislation of the usA in relation to the antitrust violations, providing 
a model for FAs in considering the possibility of the implementation of compliance 
in russia. however, the particular experience of other jurisdictions in this field, 
including the uk, have not yet been studied by FAs.
5.4.2. What Does FAS Understand by the Term ‘Compliance’ and What Are the Prospects 
for Implementation of This System in Russia?
198  See infra, Appendix.
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FAs considers compliance as a mechanism to prevent companies committing 
the antimonopoly violations and welcomes this mechanism as one of the ways 
to reduce antimonopoly violations, the level of which is quite high in russia. 
FAs widely discusses with the russian legal community issues relating to the 
development of compliance as stated in the strategy. For example, on instructions 
from FAs practitioners and experts of non-commercial partnership ‘Promoting the 
development of Competition’ consider possibilities to instil into the russian legal 
system mechanisms that would ensure certain benefits for companies so as to 
incentivise them to implement compliance programmes.
FAs believes that if the mechanisms were available in legislation, and companies 
see their benefits, in the first place economic (i.e. if the company will be able to 
reduce the potential fines after the implementation of the compliance procedures), 
this would be an effective way to promote the idea of compliance.
5.4.3. What Benefits Does FAS See in the System of Compliance?
FAs believes that in certain matters compliance can be more effective than 
coercive measures of state control as compliance has the following advantages:
– in the first place, it is voluntary and not mandatory on the part of the state;
– secondly, internal procedures, imposed by a company are more effective than 
prescriptions of antimonopoly authority, since the companies will more clearly 
adhere to the rules that they have established for themselves, at a time when 
the capabilities to control implementation of the of FAs prescriptions within the 
company are rather limited.
thus, FAs’ view is that the mechanisms for a serious self-regulation and deterrence 
of the behaviour of its employees through compliance can help to solve many of 
the problems, which FAs formerly had to solve in another way.
5.4.4. What Place is There for Compliance in the Russian Antimonopoly Regulation?
there is no clear decision on what place compliance will hold in the system of 
russian antimonopoly regulation, and is still being discussed. this is due to the fact 
that, for the introduction of compliance by the subsequent legislative mandates, 
the system of compliance must have some standards that would be perceived by 
the state for the relevant decision-making processes.
these standards should not necessarily be determined by the state, but they 
must be recognised by the state. the existence of standards will make it possible 
to avoid a situation where a compliance system in companies is built on different 
principles, whereby some companies create an entirely cosmetic programme, while 
others introduce a truly effective programme. the existence of standards would allow 
the company to be assured that, if there is the standard, it will thus be exempted from 
punishment and will obtain certain benefits. the question as to which organisation 
should formulate this standard, remains open.
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FAs is considering a possible mechanism of certification of the compliance 
programme. the idea is that certifying authority will check the internal policies of 
the company (compliance programme) and decide whether the policy and its 
implementation mechanisms comply with the standards. therefore, the company, 
following this policy, will be able to protect itself from the antimonopoly violations, and 
in the case of violations – have the right to the appropriate reduction of the penalty.
the certifying authority can be either a specialised organization, or FAs itself. the 
experts in the discussion of this matter are more inclined to transfer these powers to 
FAs, recalling the existing example of the institute of notification, when consultation 
with FAs agreements on joint activities that give the companies confidence that they 
would not be accused of being part of a cartel. such a mechanism could successfully 
be applied in the case of compliance programmes. however, from the point of view of 
FAs, this would impose additional responsibility on the antimonopoly authority.
5.4.5. What Is the Concept of FAS with Respect to the Proposed Benefits for Companies 
with Compliance Programmes?
FAs is inclined towards the elaboration of the following options, which are in 
the process of the discussion:
– to reduce the amount of administrative fines imposed on the company, applying 
the mechanism of discounts bearing in mind the extenuating circumstances;199 or
– to release the company (a legal entity) from liability and to impose an administrative 
fine on the company official who had committed the violation. All of this should be 
done only on the condition that an administrative fine will be increased for serious 
penalties, being commensurate with the nature of the committed offences.200
FAs’ view is that for the introduction of the above-mentioned benefits for the 
company, FAs may consider adding changes to the Administrative Code, including the 
part in the introduction on the compliance programme in the list of circumstances, 
extenuating administrative liability (mitigating factors). FAs is ready to develop this 
position and to give the signal to business for the development and introduction 
of compliance programmes.
5.4.6. What Is FAS’ Opinion Regarding the Positions of the Various Academics and 
Experts Who Believe That an Effective and Running Competition Compliance is Only 
Possible If There Is Criminal Liability on Company Officials Participating in the Cartel. 
Will There Be Criminal Penalties for Cartels in Russia in Practice?
In the FAs view, compliance will operate only when there is a mechanism for 
liability as such.
199  FAs states that it is possible even to reduce the fine to the minimum amount (1% of the relevant 
turnover of the company-offender in case of cartels).
200  FAs states that at the moment, the maximum fine that can be imposed on an official person has an 
insignificant amount (50,000 ruB, approximately us$1,282) which does not have a deterrent effect.
RUSSIAN LAW JOURNAL    Volume III (2015) Issue 2 90
In relation to cartel participants in russia, administrative liability includes 
turnover penalties for companies, fines and occasionally disqualification for officials 
involved. In FAs’ opinion, the very existence of significant administrative fines already 
pushes companies towards establishing security measures for their behaviour, such 
as compliance programmes, with the threat of criminal sanctions simply doubling 
the need for it.
FAs is considering criminal liability as an effective mechanism for deterring 
offences. Administrative liability is also effective, but it imposes the liability on 
the company, not on any official, often not affected by the fact that the company 
pays fines and suffers losses as a result of this employee’s action. An official should 
be aware that antimonopoly violation is very serious, that it can likely result in 
disqualification, and in the case of cartel violation subjection to criminal liability. 
As soon as there is a clear operating mechanism for criminal liability, the need for 
compliance will greatly increase.
Criminal liability is in place in the russian legislation,201 but it does not work. the 
FAs is considering 150 cartel violations over a one-year period, but they are not 
investigating further into the internal affairs authority in order to make the official 
criminally liable.202 According to FAs, to connect administrative procedures with 
criminal ones in the russian legal system is very difficult. It is hard to resolve the 
issues that have traditionally been laid out in the law as incompatible.
Another important issue is that FAs must challenge and break the current 
situation and synchronise the release of liability for the company officials within 
the frame of the Leniency Programme: with those who receive exemption from 
administrative liability being released from the criminal liability too. At present, the 
risk of criminal liability for individuals seriously slows down the development of the 
Leniency Programme.
thus FAs asserts that the synchronisation of the release of liability in administrative 
and criminal proceedings and the existence of effective liability – are the two 
important conditions for development of the compliance programme. therefore 
the reciprocal responsibility of the company and the company officials is essential.
5.4.7. What Are the Possible Mechanisms for the Recommendations of the OECD 
‘How Can the Government Promote Compliance and Ethics Programmes?’203 That May 
201  Federal Law No. 63-FZ of June 13, 1996, ‘Criminal Code of the russian Federation’ [«Уголовный 
кодекс Российской Федерации» от 13 июня 1996 г. № 63-ФЗ [‘Ugolovnyi kodeks Rossiiskoi Federatsii’ 
ot 13 iyunya 1996 g. No. 63-FZ [the Criminal Code of the russian Federation]], Art. 178.
202  In 2013, FAs referred to the investigative body 56 statements on cartels. on their basis, only 
9 cases were instituted, however, none of them have been referred to the court for further 
proceedings. See Малышева Е. ФАС хочет стать органом дознания для борьбы с картелями 
[Malysheva E. Fas khochet stat’ organom doznaniya dlya bor’by s kartelyami [Elena Malysheva, FAS 
Wants to Become an Inquiry Authority to Combat the Cartels]], rBC (Jun. 24, 2014), <http://top.rbc.ru/
economics/24/06/2014/932127.shtml> (aсcessed May 17, 2015).
203  Promoting Compliance with Competition Law, supra n. 57, Appendix III (cited in Appendix, infra, ¶ 10).
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Be Considered by FAS as Acceptable? What Is the Timeframe for Implementation of 
Compliance in Russia?
FAs believes that all of the recommendations, proposed by the oECd for the state 
promotion of the compliance programme204 can be considered by FAs for possible 
implementation.
Considering the timeframe for implementation of compliance measures, FAs 
assumes that legal decisions can be taken in a period of 1–1.5 years and then time 
will be required for the implementation of these programmes, the education and 
formation of a class of professionals who will promote this system of compliance 
measures. FAs acknowledges that the subject of compliance is at a very early 
stage, but in three to five years it believes ‘it will be possible to demonstrate the 
achievements in russia in this area at the international level.’205
6. Conclusion: Suggestions for Implementation  
of Compliance Programmes in Russia
Effective competition compliance programmes, based on the fundamental 
standards attributable to the business and the size of a particular organisation, 
must become a valuable addition to other enforcement instruments of competition 
authorities to combat cartels, along with significant fines, criminal sanctions and 
the leniency policy.
the unique and notable experience of the uk, effectively changed the approach 
of Eu law and embedded into national competition law mechanisms allowing for 
the rewarding of infringing companies for efforts to comply. the uk approach has 
been researched throughout the Paper with a view to its implementation in russia, 
where the competition compliance culture is at its very early stages. FAs which 
tended to rely primarily on the application of preventive measures in its dealing 
with violations has voiced its intention to actively respond to the developments 
of international competition practice and to promote compliance programmes to 
business practice in russia.
this research has argued that the existing prerequisites and conditions speak in 
favour of the statement that competition compliance is required in russia and could 
safely be implemented with the promised support of the FAs.
russian antitrust law has a high degree of maturity and an effective concept of 
administrative liability for violations. It demonstrates consistent progress in action 
against cartels. however, the growing number of cartel participants in russia reflects 
the need for the adoption by the FAs of measures to spread awareness of competition 
rules and to encourage businesses to comply with competition law.
204  See infra, Appendix, ¶ 10.
205  Interview.
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For that purpose, the following measures, successfully implemented by the CMA, 
may be of particular interest to the FAs:
– the publication of reports and guidance documents on competition law 
compliance; fixing at the legislative level that an effective compliance programme 
may be regarded as a mitigating factor leading to discounts in fines;
– the elaboration of a detailed four-step process, which, together with a clear 
commitment to competition law compliance by an organisation will be considered 
as evidence of adequate measures undertaken by the company to ensure the 
compliance, which, in case of violation, can be treated as sufficient grounds to reduce 
fines for the company.
At the same time, certain measures introduced by the CMA may be less 
acceptable in russia due to the peculiarities of its legal concepts. For instance, the 
CMA’s relatively liberal position in granting discounts to companies that implement 
adequate compliance measures once the investigation has begun, though at a lower 
level of discount, is unlikely to be considered reasonable, at least at this stage of the 
development of competition law in russia.
Further, the existence of uncertainty for whatever reason in adequate assessment 
by the CMA of the compliance programmes of companies seeking a reduction in 
fines, may be improved in russia by the creation of a system of certification of 
compliance programmes, which appears to be more appropriate for russian law.
the Paper, therefore, concludes by proposing a three-step plan of action for the FAs 
to implement competition compliance programmes in accordance with the strategy.
6.1. Step 1: Initial Stage
the purpose of the first stage measures is to create a transparent and predictable 
environment for market players with regard to the potential liability and benefits 
that the FAs could provide in the presence of mitigating circumstances.
1. Initially, FAs should take a number of preparatory steps to enhance the liability 
mechanisms that are insufficiently effective, such as: (i) the synchronisation of 
exemption from administrative and criminal liability under the Leniency Programme; 
(ii) administrative liability for officers in the form of large fines commensurate with 
the violation and disqualification; (iii) criminal liability for employees involved in 
cartels; and (iv) civil liability in the form of compensation for damages.
2. FAs should undertake certain preparatory procedures focusing on the 
promotion of compliance culture, including:
– a review of the lessons learned from best international practice, including 
the uk, and consultation with international experts on the implementation of a 
competition compliance framework;
– the establishment of an internal entity within the FAs with responsibility for 
the development and implementation of integrated activities aimed at advocacy 
of antitrust compliance to deter antitrust violations [hereinafter FAs Entity]. the 
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appointment of a government official who would manage the FAs Entity and be 
responsible for compliance and ethical connections and the training of compliance 
professionals in the FAs, including its regional antimonopoly bodies, to ensure a high 
level of governmental support of competition culture implementation;
– the development of efficient compliance programme models by the FAs Entity; 
including the publication of guidance and clarifications on the FAs website, the 
provision of recommendations to business and legal communities on adoption of 
such programmes, outreach and advocacy activities, educational workshops and 
conferences. the particular experience of the CMA, including the four-step process, 
discussed in secs. 4.2–4.4 of the Paper may be taken as a model example in this 
respect.
6.2. Step 2: Intermediate Stage
1. After a lapse of a certain period (1–1.5 years) after the Initial stage, the FAs 
should carry out a comprehensive assessment of the impact made by the new 
preventive methods on the frequency and nature of offences committed by market 
players. this may be conducted in the form of research, similar to the CMA’s reports206 
with publication of its results.
2. depending on the results obtained, subsequent compliance implementation 
measures should be determined by FAs. these should lead either to further 
improvement of deficient mechanisms or to the next stage of implementation of 
integrated measures at the legislative level.
3. FAs should develop and establish a system of standards at this stage that can 
ensure the compliance framework is built on the same principles. this framework 
may involve certification of compliance programmes, which makes businesses 
confident that their corporate programmes and policies meet legal requirements. In 
comparison to the CMA’s evaluation system, this certification mechanism establishes 
a more transparent and predictable system for the market players to guarantee that 
their programmes are in compliance with the competition law.
6.3. Step 3: Final Stage
In the Final stage, FAs should introduce amendments to antimonopoly legislation, 
in particular, to the Administrative Code with a view to establishing a preferential 
treatment mechanism for companies with compliance programmes in place, should 
they violate the antitrust law and be subject to administrative sanctions.
the proposed changes may include:
– inclusion of the company’s efficient compliance programme on the list of 
circumstances that mitigate administrative liability and therefore taken into account 
when decreasing the amount of the fine for a cartel agreement;
206  oFt report, supra n. 110.
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– introduction of other norms at the discretion of the FAs, e.g. releasing a 
company from liability and imposing a substantially larger administrative fine on 
the offending company officer.
to conclude, with a sufficiently mature environment in place for the integration 
of compliance programmes into the russian competition laws, FAs can successfully 
carry out a programme to set up a legislative mechanism and phase it into russian 
competition law and business practice. this would raise the competition compliance 
culture in russia to be in line with one of the best international practices – the uk.
Appendix
Questionnaire for the Federal Antimonopoly Service of Russia (FAS)
1. what does FAs understand by the term ‘compliance’ and what are the prospects 
for implementation of this system in russia?
2. what benefits does FAs see in the compliance programmes?
3. what place is there for compliance in the russian antimonopoly regulation?
4. what impediments can FAs foresee in the introduction of the compliance 
system in russia?
5. what is the concept of FAs with respect to the proposed benefits for companies 
with compliance programmes?
6. For what markets in russia is compliance especially important and what 
challenges may it resolve in these markets?
7. what particularities of the introduction of compliance programmes may be 
caused by the specifics of russian economy, in view of the complex transformation 
from state regulation to the free market?
8. what may be an incentive for russian companies to implement compliance 
programmes?
9. what is FAs’ opinion regarding the positions of the various academics and 
experts who believe that an effective antimonopoly compliance is only possible if 
there is a criminal liability for company officials, participating in the cartels. will there 
be criminal penalties for cartels in russia in practice?
10. what are the possible mechanisms for the recommendations by oECd ‘how 
Can the government Promote Compliance and Ethics Programmes’ considered by 
the FAs as acceptable for russia:
– take effective programs into account in decisions to prosecute;
– offer a reduction in penalties for those with effective programmes;
– publicize the actual benefits given to companies with good programmes;
– use practical, flexible standards in assessing programmes;
– publish a strong governmental policy favouring effective compliance and 
ethics programmes as in the public interest;
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– offer the benefit for effective programmes in government procurement;
– provide a role model of a robust compliance and ethical approach through 
government agency compliance and ethics programmes;
– have an internal governmental official as a compliance and ethics liaison?207
11. what is the approximate timeframe for implementation of compliance in russia?
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